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How Much do Firms Hedge with Derivatives?
Abstract
Previous research offers little large-sample evidence on the magnitude of non-fmancial
fums' risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. In a sample of 234 large non-fmancial
corporations that use derivatives, we fmd that if the median fum simultaneously experiences a
three standard deviation change in interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices,
it will collect $15 million of cash from its entire derivatives portfolio and that the entire
derivatives portfolio will rise in value by $31 million. These dollar amounts are modest relative
to fum size, operating cash flows, investing cash flows and other fum benchmarks. The fmdings
raise questions about the role of derivatives securities held by non-fmancial ftrms.

1.

Introduction
Corporate risk management 1s thought to be an important element of a firm's overall

business strategy.

Stulz (1996, pp. 23-24) draws upon extant theories of corporate risk

management to argue ''the primary goal of risk management is to eliminate the probability of
costly lower-tail outcomes - those that would cause fmancial distress or make a company unable
to carry out its investment strategy. ,,J.

Financial derivatives - currency, interest rate, and

commodity derivatives - are one means of managing risks facing corporations.

If a fmn's

derivative positions generate positive cash flows or value in periods of economic adversity, then
those derivatives are deemed to hedge the frrm's risk
Previous research presents mixed evidence that corporate uses of fmancial derivatives are
consistent with the extant theories of corporate hedging.

With the exception of industry studies

like Tufano (19%) and a detailed case study like Brown (2001), previous research analyzes
categorical data on whether corporations use fmancial derivatives, or data on the notional
principal of corporate derivative positions to test whether corporate uses of derivatives accord
with the corporate risk management theories. 2 However, none of the previous studies documents
large-sample evidence on the magnitude of risk hedged by the firms' fmancial derivatives. The
primary objective of our study is to provide insight into the importance of corporations' fmancial
derivatives portfolios in managing risk
For a random sample of 234 large non-fmancial corporations, we present detailed
evidence on the cash flow and market value sensitivities of fmancial derivative portfolios to
extreme changes in the underlying assets' prices.

That is, for simultaneous extreme changes m

1

See Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), DeMarzo and Duffie ( 1991), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Smith
(1 995), Ross (1997), and Leland (1998), among others.

2

See Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1 993), Dolde ((1995), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Mian (1996), Tufano
(1 996), Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1 997 and 1999), Petersen and Thiagarajan (1997), Allaynnis and Ofek (1998),
Haushalter (2000), Brown (2001), Gay and N am (1999), Guay (1999), Howton and Perfect (1999), Rajgopal and
Shevlin (1 999), Loderer and Pichler (2000), Hentschel and Kothari (200 1), and Graham and Rogers (2000).
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interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity pnces, we estimate (i) the dollar cash flow that a
fum would derive from its derivatives portfolio, referred to as the cash flow sensitivity; and (ii)
the change in the market value of the fum's derivatives portfolio, referred to as the market value
sensitivity.

For each sample fum, we estimate the derivatives portfolio's cash flow and market

value sensitivities using corporate disclosures about the types of interest rate, currency, and
commodity derivative securities held by a fum, the notional principals of each type of security,
and the derivatives' remaining time to maturity. Information about corporate derivative positions
is gathered from fums' Form 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
for the fiscal year 1997.
In estimating the magnitude of risk hedged by a fum 's derivatives portfolio, we make
three assumptions intended to ensure that we do not underestimate the importance of derivatives
securities in fums' hedging programs.

First, we assume each fum's entire derivatives portfolio

hedges its downside risk exposure (i.e., the cash flow generated by each derivative security is
perfectly negatively correlated with the fum's unhedged cash flow).

Second, we estimate the

sensitivity of each fum's derivatives positions to extreme changes in the underlying asset prices
(i.e., interest rates, currency exchange rates, or commodity prices), where we defme an extreme
change as three times the annual standard deviation of the historical time series of movements in
the asset prices.

Finally, we assume that the prices of all three underlying assets simultaneously

experience a three standard deviation change, and that the effects of these price movements on
the cash flows and value of firms' derivatives positions are perfectly positively correlated.

Summary of results. The median derivatives user's derivatives portfolio consists of
interest rate derivatives with a notional principal of $200 million, currency derivatives with a
notional principal of $123 million, and commodity derivatives with a notional principal of $51
million. The median (75th percentile) fum's derivative cash flow sensitivity is $15 ($85) million,
and the market value sensitivity is $31 ($129) million. That is, when the median derivatives user
fum simultaneously experiences a three standard deviation change in interest rates, currency
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exchange rates, and commodity pnces, the entire derivatives portfolio nses m value by $31
million, with $15 million of this amount coming as cash flow in the current period. As indicated
above, our calculations are generous in that we assume the underlying assets' price changes are
all in the direction that would generate cash inflow from each finn's interest rate, currency, and
commodity derivatives positions.
For most of the sample fums, the cash flow and market value sensitivities are small
relative to the magnitudes of operating and investing cash flows, absolute values of the changes
in operating cash flows, and measures of economic exposures. For example, the median
derivatives user's annual operating cash flow and investing cash outflow are $178 and $178
million, respectively. As another example, our regression estimates of the sensitivity of the
median fum's equity value to a three standard deviation change in interest rates and currency
exchange rates is $825 million and $458 million, respectively. We reach similar conclusions
when the cash flow and matket value sensitivities are compared to the fums' other economic
characteristics, such as fum size, cash holdings, PPE expenditures, and absolute changes in
operating cash flow or accounting income.

In addition to reporting average magnitudes of cash flow and market value sensitivities
for the derivatives users, we examine whether the fmns that theory predicts to benefit most from
hedging hold derivatives positions with relatively larger cash flow and matket value sensitivities.
For example, corporate hedging theories suggest that high volatility of fum value and cash flows,
the presence of investment opportunities, and high leverage should incline fums to engage m
hedging activities. We also consider agency theory predictions that managers might hedge to
reduce contracting costs. For example, fums may allow CEOs with eammgs- and stock-based
compensation contracts to remove uncontrollable market risks, or may allow managers in a
multi-divisional fum to hedge away market exposures in their respective performance. We fmd
some evidence of increased use of derivatives for larger fums and fums with greater investment
opportunities, as well as for more geographically diverse fums and when CEOs have a greater
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sensitivity of wealth to stock pnce. However, the magnitudes of the derivatives positions are
quite small for all partitions of the data. For example, the quintile of firms with hrgest market-tobook ratios would receive 17% of its annual investing cash flow from its derivatives portfolio in
the event of a simultaneous three standard deviation change in interest rates, currency exchange
rates, and commodity prices. Further, several of the fum characteristics are correlated, and
multivariate tests

indicate that only geographic diversification

consistently explains fmns'

hedging intensity.
In summary, the results suggest most fmns hold derivatives positions that are small in

magnitude relative to their typical investment cash flows

or market value sensitivities.

Maintaining an economically small derivatives program is potentially consistent with fmns: i)
using derivatives to ' 'fme tune" their overall risk-management program that likely includes other
means of hedging (e.g., operational hedges through diversified manufacturing sites),3 ii) making
decentralized decisions on derivatives use (e.g., divisional decision making) for

internal

budgeting or performance evaluation purposes,4 or iii) using derivatives for purposes other than
risk-management (e.g., to speculate on asset prices).

Outline of the paper.

Section 2 reviews the theories of corporate risk management.

Section 3 describes sample selection and presents descriptive statistics on the econom1c
characteristics of sample firms and their derivative positions.

The main results of the paper

appear in Section 4. We report the sample flfffiS' cash flow and market value sensitivities in the
event of extreme changes in the underlying assets' prices.

3

Section 4 also reports descriptive

If this conclusion is valid, it emphasizes the importance of considering corporate derivatives use within the context
of a much larger hedging program in empirical studies of corporate risk management. One potential driver of this
finding is that much of the overall risk facing firms (e.g., operating risk) cannot be managed through the use of
standard derivatives contracts written over assets prices such as interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices.
Further, some firms may restrict their use of derivatives to transaction-based hedging, such as managing the risk
inherent in foreign sales/purchases or specific interest-bearing debt securities.
4
Brown (200 1) reaches some similar conclusions using extensive transaction-level derivatives data for one large
multinational corporation. Specifically, he finds that the impact of the derivatives instruments has a limited effect
on the firm's cash flows, and that internal budgeting and performance evaluation play a substantial part with respect
to the objectives of the derivatives program.
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statistics for the sensitivities as a fraction of the sample fums' economic exposures in the event
of extreme movements in the underlying assets' prices and their historical average cash flow
variability. We summarize the paper and offer conclusions in section 5.

2.

Hypothesis development and risk management theory
In the absence of market imperfections, hedging does not affect fum value (Modigliani

and J\1iller, 1958).

The theory of corporate risk management identifies several market

imperfections that can make volatility costly.

These imperfections can be broadly summarized

as: (i) fmancial distress costs (J\1yers, 1977; Smith and Stutz, 1985); (ii) costly external fmancing
(Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993); (iii) taxes (Smith and Stutz, 1985); and (iv) costs of
managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985).
While all of the risk management theories posit that hedging can increase finn value, the
type of fum risk targeted by the theories varies.

The fmancial distress cost arguments generally

point toward volatility of fum value as the risk measure to be hedged.

Smith and Stulz ( 1985)

argue that hedging can increase the value of a levered fum when the expected costs of fmancial
distress are decreasing in fum-value.

By narrowing the distribution of fum-value outcomes,

hedging reduces the expected costs of fmancial distress.

Myers (1977) demonstrates that

fmancial distress can provide equityholders with incentives to forgo positive net-present-value
projects if the gains accrue primarily to ftxed claimholders.

Hedging fum value reduces the

probability of distress and the likelihood that equityholders will fmd it beneficial to pass up
valuable projects.
The hedging theories that emphasize costly external fmancing focus on the volatility of
cash flows as the risk measure to be hedged. For example, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)
hypothesize that if external fmancing is more costly than internal fmancing, hedging can be a
value-increasing activity if it more closely matches fimd inflows with outflows, thereby lowering
the probability that a fum needs to access the capital markets.

With respect to tax motivations

for hedging, Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that a reduction in the volatility of taxable
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mcome can lower expected taxes for fmns with convex effective tax functions. 5

Finally, when

managers are risk averse and under-diversified with respect to their compensation and fumspecific wealth, they are likely to require extra compensation to bear this risk

Thus, managers

have an incentive to reduce fmn risk and hedging can potentially reduce the required risk
premmm (Stulz, 1984 and Smith and Stulz, 1985).

However, the type of risk targeted for

hedging, be it cash flow, earnings, or stock price volatility, is likely to depend on the nature of
the managers' compensation contract and fum-specific wealth.
The risk management theories are relevant to this study because our goal is to examme
the extent to which fums hedge their risk exposures with derivative securities. The risk
management theories described above point to at least three risk exposures of interest: (i)
volatility of fum value; (ii) volatility of cash flows; and (iii) volatility of income. Because it is
not possible to identify a single risk measure that fully captures a fmn's motivation for using
derivatives, we examine the magnitude of frrms' derivatives positions relative to each of these
risk measures for all sample fmns.
To gain additional perspective on fmns' risk management practices, we also examine the
magnitude of risk hedged by the derivatives positions relative to other fmn characteristics:

5

(i)

Firm size measured as market value of equity, book value of assets, cash flow
from operations, net income, and absolute values of the changes in operating cash
flows and net income;

(ii)

Investing activities measured as PPE expenditures and cash flow from investing
activities;

(iii)

Liquidity measured as cash and marketable securities;

(iv)

Interest expense for fmns that use interest-rate derivatives; and

Although we do examine income volatility as a potential determinant of derivatives use, we do not conduct a
detailed analysis of tax convexity as a determinant of derivatives use. Graham and Smith (1999) find that tax
convexity is not large for most firms and Graham and Rogers (2000) find that tax convexity is not an important
determinant of derivatives use.
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(v)

Exposures of stock returns to fmancial prices, such as interest rates for fums that
use interest-rate derivatives and exchange rates for fums that use exchange-rate
derivatives.

The preceding discussion focuses on fums ' risk management incentives under the
assumption that managers' incentives are aligned with the shareholders.

However, agency

considerations

their self-interest.

might motivate managers

to

use derivatives

to further

Managers of large fums with diversified business segment operations and geographically diverse
operations might engage in hedging to smooth out their divisional performance.

In addition, risk

averse managers might seek to smooth out their divisional or frrm-level earnings performance
through derivatives because they are compensated based in part on their accounting performance.
We use several proxies to capture managers' agency incentives for using derivatives and test
whether these are correlated with the fmns' intensity of derivatives use.

3.

Sam pie selection and descriptive statistics
Section 3.1 describes our sample selection procedure and the derivatives variables for

which we gather information from firms' fmancial filings.

In section 3.2 we present descriptive

statistics on a number of economic characteristics of the sample frrms that are useful in assessing
the degree to which firms' derivatives positions might hedge potential risks facing the frrms.
Section 3.3 explains the procedure we employ to calculate cash flow and market value
sensitivities using information about frrms' derivatives positions and extreme movements in the
underlying asset prices.
3.1 Sample selection
We use the Compustat Annual database to identifY an initial sample of the 1,000 largest
market valued stocks as of the end of 1995. We also require that these stocks have return data on
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes and that they have a December fiscal
year-end for fmancial reporting purposes.

We focus on large stocks because previous evidence

shows that large fums are more likely derivatives users (see, for example, Nance, Smith, and

8

Smithson, 1993, Graham and Rogers, 2000, and Hentschel and Kothari, 2000). Another reason
is that the largest 1,000 firms represent a large fraction of the value-weighted portfolio of the
U.S. stocks and thus are economically important. Availability of return data on CRSP enables us
to estimate fums ' economic exposures and market value sensitivities.

Finally, restricting the

sample to December year-end fmns facilitates data analysis by allowing consistent assumptions
about prevailing interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices when we estimate cash flow
and market value sensitivities.
From the initial sample of 1,000 largest fmns, we select every other fum and reduce the
sample to 500 fums.

The reason for this reduction is to facilitate our hand collection of a

significant quantity of information about each fnm 's derivative positions as of December 1997
from Form 10-K filings with the SEC for ftscal year 1997.6 Of the 500 sample fums, 73 fums
merged or went out of business between the sample selection year, 1995, and the year the
derivatives data are collected, 1997. This attrition is more common among the smaller firms in
the sample.

We exclude fums if the Form 10-K filings indicate that derivatives are used for

trading purposes as opposed to hedging purposes.

We drop 15 fmns that state trading as the

purpose for at least a portion of their use of derivatives.
For each fum, we collect FYE 1997 information on the types of derivative securities
held, the notional principal of each derivative instrument held, the remaining time-to-maturity of
each instrument held, and whether the firm uses derivatives for trading purposes. Fiscal year
1997 is the latest year for which data were available at the time we began gathering data for this
study.

For 1997, GAAP pertaining to disclosure about fmancial derivatives is contained in

Financial Accounting Standard No. 119, ' 'Disclosure about derivative fmancial instruments and

6

Even though we gather derivatives data for 1997, we select the sample from 1,000 largest firms as of 1995, not
1997. The reason is that market value is positively correlated with immediate past performance (i.e., largest firms
are likely to have experienced good past {Erformance and smallest firms bad performance). If firms' use of
derivatives at the end of a period is correlated with past performance, use of 1997 market value rankings might have
confounded with the analysis . To avoid this danger, we sample firms from amongst the 1,000 largest firms as of the
end of 1995.

9

fair value of fmancial instruments," which was released in 1994.

Appendix A contains a sample

of derivatives disclosure according to SFAS 119 for Intel Corporation in its 1997 Form 10-K
filing with the SEC.
3.2 Descriptive characteristics

In Table 1, we present means and medians of fum size and a number of operating flow
variables, including three-year average cash flow from operations and average absolute change
in cash flow from operations, average net income, and average property, plant, and equipment
expenditures, etc.

We select these variables because corporate hedging theories argue that risk

management programs are designed to either make-up potential shortfalls in cash flows from
operations to be used for investment purposes or to hedge against a drop in finn value.

Later

analysis calibrates changes in the market value of fums ' derivatives positions against finn size,
and cash flow from fums' derivative positions against operating flow variables and against
absolute values of the changes in the flow variables.

Such comparisons are one means of

examining the extent to which fums' derivatives positions hedge market values, operating flows,
and shocks to operating flows in the event of extreme changes in the underlying assets' prices.
For each descriptive variable, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report mean and median values
for the aggregate sample; the next two columns provide descriptive statistics separately for
derivatives users and the last two columns contain data for derivatives non-users.

Firms

reporting derivative positions at flScal year-end 1997 are users and non-users report no derivative
positions. There are 234 (56.7%) derivatives users out of the aggregate sample of 413 fums and
the remaining 179 (43.3%) fnms are non-users of derivatives. We mainly discuss the descriptive
statistics for the derivatives users because the analysis examining the extent to which derivatives
are used for risk management pertains to derivatives users.

While the average market value of

$5.9 billion for the aggregate sample is large because of our sample selection criterion, the
derivatives users are the relatively larger fnms with an average market value of $8.6 billion,
compared to $2.4 billion for the non-users. Market value as well as all other variables in Table 1
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exhibit right skewness in that the medians are considerably lower than the means, but even the
median firm is quite large.
[Table 1]
The flow variables in Table 1 are three-year annual averages usmg data from 1995 to
1997.

The descriptive statistics suggest derivatives users generally have large positive operating

cash flows, net incomes, and investment cash flows.

Average annual cash flow from operations

for the users is $735 million and these fmns on average invest $454 million in property, plant,
and equipment annually.

The fmns are highly profitable in that derivatives users' mean

(median) average annual net income is $318 million ($74 million).

As an indicabm of the cash

flow shocks the derivative users experience, we report the three-year average absolute change in
annual cash flow from operations and net income, as well as the maximum absolute change in
annual cash flow from operations and net income during the years 1995-1997. The average
(maximum) absolute change in cash flow from operations is $194 million ($349 million) for the
derivatives users and the corresponding numbers for net income changes are $139 million ($230
million).
3.3 Derivatives data and descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the notional principal of the derivatives positions
as reported in the fmns ' Form 10-K filings at the 1997 fiscal year end. The information applies
only to the 234 derivatives user sample fmns.

We partition the derivatives into foreign

exchange, interest-rate, and commodity instruments.

In each category, we further partition the

instruments by type, e.g., swaps, forwards, and options.

For each fum, we sum the notional

principal for each type of security held in each category. The first column in Table 2 reports the
number of fmns that hold each type of security, and the next seven columns provide descriptive
statistics for the outstanding notional principal calculated using data for the fmns that hold those
securities. The last two columns provide the mean and standard deviation of time-to-maturity for
each category of securities held by the fmns. Note that these descriptive statistics describe the
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reported derivatives positions held by the fnms at fiscal year end and may differ somewhat from
the average derivatives positions held by the firms during the year.
Consistent with the fmdings in previous research, Table 2 reveals that foreign exchange
(FX) and interest rate (IR) derivatives constitute the bulk of the activity both in terms of the
number of users and the amount of derivatives used. Within the FX derivatives category, 124 of
the 143 users have positions in forwards and futures, whereas only 33 fmns have FX swaps and
27 have FX options.

Median notional principal of the FX forwards and futures users is $68

million and ranges from $0.6 million to $9.5 billion.

The median notional principals are

substantially greater for FX swap and option users at $243 million and $203 million,
respectively.

Of the 143 fnms that hold IR derivatives, swaps are the most popular securities

(137 users), whereas IR caps and forwards are used by only a handful of fmns (24 users). The
median fnm 's IR swap position, however, is only $180 million of notional principal. Thllty-six
firms use commodity derivatives with a median notional principal of $40 million across all three
instnunents- forwards and futures, swaps, and options. 7

[Table 2]
The average time-to-maturity of the FX and IR swaps is about 5 years compared to about
1-2 years for commodity derivatives and FX and IR forwards and options. This is not surprising
because swap contracts are typically designed to hedge periodic cash flows over long horizons
(e.g., bond interest payments), whereas long-horizon forwards and options contracts are
extremely illiquid or non-existent

4.

Results: Derivative positions' market value and cash flow
sensitivities
In this section, we present evidence on the cash flow and market value sensitivities

derivatives positions to extreme changes in the underlying asset prices.

7

a the

We begin by describing

For reporting purposes, certain types of commodity positions are not considered derivative instruments. For
example, long-term purchase or sales contracts that fix commodity prices are not considered derivatives for
reporting purposes if they are expected to settle in units of the commodity as opposed to cash.
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how we calculate the sensitivities for each derivative security. We then examme the extent to
which the derivative positions can potentially hedge fnms ' market values or operating flows m
the event of extreme asset price movements. At the end of this section we explore whether the
sensitivities of the derivatives positions are relatively larger for subsamples of fums with greater
expected incentives to hedge. We also examine whether additional variables chosen to proxy for
managers' agency-theory-based incentives to hedge (e.g., eammgs smoothing and hedging in a
multi-divisional fum)

explain cross-sectional variation

in the

intensity

of fmns'

hedging

activities.
4.1 Estimation procedure for derivative sensitivities
We estimate the cash flow and market value sensitivities of each fum's aggregate
derivatives portfolio position at 1997 ftscal year end.

Cash flow sensitivity is defined as the

change in the annual cash flow resulting from each derivative security in the portfolio for a three
standard deviation annual change in the price of underlying asset (i.e., change in interest rates,
exchange rates, or commodity prices). Similarly, we defme market value sensitivity as the
change in the value of each derivative security for a three standard deviation annual change in
the prices of underlying assets. We assume that the cash flow and change in value are perfectly
positively correlated within each class of derivative security (i.e., none of the positions are
offsetting). Graham and Rogers (2000) report that, on average, after netting out offsetting long
and short derivatives positions, fums' net notional principal is only 50% of gross notional
principal. 1bis fmding suggests our measures of fums' gross derivative sensitivities are likely to
substantially overstate fums' net derivative sensitivities.

We estimate cash flow (market value)

sensitivities for each fum as the sum of cash flow (market value) sensitivities across all the
derivative securities in the portfolio.

8

8

We recognize that shocks to asset prices are not necessarily normally distributed, and as such, the probability of a
three standard deviation change can be greater than that suggested by the normal distribution. Our choice of three
standard deviations is simply intended to represent a low probability event.
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The market value sensitivity measure 1s relevant to assessmg the derivatives portfolio's
importance for risk management if firms use derivatives to hedge flrm value. For example, fums
may wish to mitigate stock price exposure to changes in interest rates, exchange rates, or
commodity prices to reduce the probability and costs of fmancial distress and underinvestment
problems.

The cash flow sensitivity measure is useful in gauging the importance of derivatives

for risk management if firms use derivatives to hedge cash flows or income. For example, firms
may use derivatives to dampen cash flow volatility to reduce the likelihood that they incur the
costs of accessing external capital matkets to undertake valuable investment opportunities.
We illustrate our estimation of the cash flow and market value sensitivities below usmg
foreign exchange forwards and then discuss the estimation of interest rate and commodity
derivative sensitivities.

Similar details for other FX derivatives instruments, e.g., swaps and

options, and for interest rate and commodity derivatives appear in Appendix B, with only a
summary of the salient issues pertaining to the estimation procedure in the text below.

Caslt flow and market value sensitivity of FX forwards.

The cash flow sensitivity

(matket value sensitivity) of FX derivatives to exchange rate movements is measured as the
estimated change in FX derivatives' annual cash flows (value) for a simultaneous, perfectly
positively correlated 33% change in the currency exchange rates underlying the FX derivatives.
We use 33% because it equals three times the average historical standard deviation of annualized
percentage changes in the US dollar exchange rates for the ten most heavily weighted currencies
in the Federal ResetVe's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar Index. The annualized standard
deviations are computed using quarterly observations over the 10-yr period from 1988 through
1997.9

9

To annualize the exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price standard deviations, we multiply the quarterly
standards deviations by the square root of 4. This procedure assumes independence across the qu arterly changes.
Empirically the autocorrelations across quarterly changes are small, ranging from -0.12 for our commodity price
index to +0.1 4 for interest rate series.
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The cash flow sensitivity of an FX forward contract to a three standard deviation change
in the currency exchange rate is estimated as
($ notional principal) x 33%.
Because FX forwards ahnost invariably have maturities of a year or less, we assume the market
value and cash flow sensitivities to be the same. For longer duration derivatives, such as swaps,
the market value and cash flow sensitivities will be different, often substantially so.

Even if the

forward contract matures in less than one year, we assume a 33% rate change, which is greater
than a three standard deviation change for a horizon of only a fraction of one year.

Interest rate and commodity derivatives.

We measure market value (cash flow)

sensitivity of IR derivatives to interest rate movements as the estimated change in IR derivatives'
value (annual cash flow) for a 3.4 percentage point change in the 6-month yield on J:.bills. The
choice of 3.4 percentage points reflects a 3 standard deviation change in the annualized
percentage point change in the 6-month T-hill yield using quarterly observations over the 10-yr
period from January 1988 through December 1997.
We estimate commodity derivatives' sensitivity to a 37% change in the underlying
commodity pnce.

For our sample fmns, a majority of the commodity derivatives are written

over some form of fuel-related resource, e.g., petroleum and natural gas.

The choice of 37%

reflects a three-standard-deviation change in the annualized percentage return on the quarterly
Producer Price Index for Fuel over the 10-yr period from January 1988 through December 1997.
An alternative choice for the commodity index would be a more general index, such as the

Producer Price Index for All Commodities.

However, because this index reflects a portfolio of

commodity prices, its volatility is far lower than the volatility of a single commodity index.

For

example, the annualized standard deviation of the All Commodities Index is 2% versus 12.5%
for the Fuel Index, though the correlation between these two indexes is high at 0.81.

Therefore,

we choose the more volatile Fuel Index to avoid underestimating the sensitivity of the
commodity derivatives positions.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics on sensitivities

Table 3 reports descriptive data on cash flow and market value sensitivities for the
derivatives users ' aggregate derivatives portfolios and also by type of derivative security.

The

mean and median market value sensitivities for the fmns ' aggregate derivatives portfolios are
$158 million and $31 million, respectively.

The corresponding mean and median aggregate cash

flow sensitivities are $112 million and $15 million.

The disparity between the mean and median

underscores the influence of a relatively few intensive derivatives users (e.g., the largest market
value and cash flow sensitivities are $3.4 billion and $3.2 billion, respectively).

On average, FX

derivatives make a larger contribution to cash flow sensitivity than IR derivatives. However,
because the average time to maturity for IR derivatives is considerably longer than that of FX
derivatives, the contribution of IR and FX derivatives to market value sensitivity is roughly
equal. For most fmns, commodity derivatives contribute substantially less sensitivity than either
FX or IR derivatives.
[Table 3]
In interpreting the sensitivities reported in Table 3, note that our assumptions m

estimating aggregate sensitivity measures are extremely generous in the following respects: i)
For each fmn, all derivative securities of the same type are assumed to have payoffs that are
perfectly positively correlated. For example, if a fum holds ten different FX contracts on ten
different currencies, the value of all the contracts are assumed to move together.

Similarly, if a

fmn holds a combination of IR swaps, caps, and forwards, the values of all the securities are
assumed to move together with interest rates. ii) All option-like securities are assumed to be deep
in the money, thereby we assume the maximum sensitivity.

iii) The aggregate sensitivity is an

estimate of the change in the value of a fmn's derivative securities assuming a three standard
shock simultaneously occurs for interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity pnces.

Further,

we assume that the cash flow and value implications of all three shocks are perfectly positively
correlated across all types of derivatives held.
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To determine the likely implications of this third assumption for our results, we examme
the correlation structure across interest-rate, exchange-rate and commodity (PPI) price indices
for the period January 1988 to December 1997. The indices exhibit moderate cross-correlations,
ranging from 0.23 to -0.40. To explore the extent to which our assumption of perfect positive
correlation across the indices overstates the sensitivities in Table 3, we estimate the expected
change in any two of the indices when the third index experiences a three standard deviation
change. To do this, we ftrst standardize the three time-series to have the same standard deviation
in price changes and then estimate pair-wise regressions between each of the indices. The
regresston coefficients reflect the expected change in an index (measured in standard deviations)
for a one standard deviation change in another index. Extrapolating these coefficients to a three
standard deviation change yields the following table:
Three standard

Expected change in

Expected change in

Expected change in

interest rates (in

exchange rates (in

commodity prices (in

standard deviations)

standard deviations)

standard deviations)

Interest rates

3.0

0.8

0.4

Exchange rates

0.8

3.0

1.0

Commodity prices

0.4

1.0

3.0

deviation change in:

The above table suggests that the probability of a simultaneous three standard deviation change
in all three indices is much less likely than a three standard deviation change in any one index.
Further, conditional on a three standard deviation change in one index, the expected change in
the other two indices is considerably smaller than three standard deviations. This analysis
suggests that our estimates substantially overestimate the aggregate cash flow and market value
sensitivities of the derivatives positions in the event of a large shock to any one of the underlying
asset prices.
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4.3 Scaled sensitivities

If derivative securities are an important component of risk management programs
designed to increase fmn value, the potential change in the value of a fnm's derivatives positions
should be economically significant when compared to potential hedging objectives, such as fmn
value, operating flows, and/or the fmn's underlying risk exposures.

Since the appropriate

comparison depends upon the objective of the risk management program and theories of risk
management, we report results comparing fnms ' derivative positions' sensitivities to a variety of
fmn characteristics.
Table 4 scales fmns ' aggregate derivatives portfolios' cash flow and market value
sensitivities by the sample characteristics in Table 1. 10 In interpreting the scaled sensitivities, we
assume that the derivative securities' value is perfectly negatively correlated with the scaling
variable, i.e., the derivatives are perfect hedges.

To the extent that the derivatives are not a

perfect hedge (and it is inconceivable that they are a perfect hedge for all of the scaling
variables), the reported scaled sensitivities overstate the potential impact of the derivatives
positions on the firms' risk management program. Also, note that, unlike the numerators in the
scaled sensitivities, the data from the denominators are simply taken from the three most recent
years, 1995-1997, and are not selected to reflect extreme realizations. Further, some of the
scaling variables, such as cash flows, income and assets, are influenced by the cash flow
realizations from fmns' derivative positions. The extent to which our scaling variables reflect
"normal" years and are affected by realizations from derivatives positions depends in part on
whether movements m interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices were "unusual"
during the 1995-1997 period. An analysis comparing prce movements during the 1995-1997

10

The scaling variables measure firm characteristics that could potentially be targeted for hedging and are not direct
measures of firms' risk exposures. It is possible that many of the firms' assets and cash flows are not highly sensitive
to changes in interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices. For these firms, the derivatives sensitivities are
expected to be small relative to the firm characteristics, even if the firms are using derivatives to fully hedge their
core exposures. However, in these cases, one would still conclude that derivatives use is not an economically
important component of a risk management program designed to increase firm value.
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period with price movements during the longer 1988-1997 period indicates that the 1995-1997
period was not unusual. Interest rate, exchange rate and commodity price volatilities were
slightly lower during 1995-1997 compared to 1988-1997, and the 1997 levels of these asset
prices were not substantially different from the 1995 levels.
Even with these and earlier discussed generous assumptions, the results in Table 4
suggest that for most fnms, the sensitivities are not a hrge fraction of the scaling variables. For
example, the matket value sensitivity as a fraction of the market value of equity averages 0.04,
the median is 0.01, and the 75th percentile is 0.04. Thus for three quarters of the sample fnms, in
the event of extreme simultaneous movements in interest rates, currency exchange rates, and
commodity prices, the generously estimated change in the value of the fnms ' aggregate
derivatives portfolio is no greater than 4% of their current equity market values.
[Table 4]
Average values of the cash flow sensitivities as a fraction of the fnms' operating flow
variables are quite large (e.g., 0.58 when the scale is three-year average CFO), but are driven by
extreme observations (e.g., the maximum is 30.23), generally resulting from small denominators,
i.e., low average flow values. The median scaled values are between 0.10 and 0.30 for most of
the variables. For example, the estimated values suggest that the cash flow from the derivatives
portfolio would be 90/o of the three-year average investing cash flow in the event of extreme
movements in the underlying asset prices.

Considered in isolation, this increment to a fum's

cash flows under extreme circumstances seems low, especially in light of the generous
assumptions we make in estimating the sensitivities.

The extent to which shocks to operating

cash flows are hedged can be inferred from the cash flow sensitivity scaled by the three-year
average of the absolute changes in operating cash flow or the three-year maximum absolute cash
flow change. The median ratios of these two variables are 0.18 and 0.33. Overall, the evidence
suggests either derivatives constitute a small fraction of a fum 's overall risk-management
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program and/or finns leave a large portion of their financial risks unhedged, and/or derivatives
securities are frequently used for purposes other than hedging entity-level risk
The preceding analysis examines derivatives portfolios' sensitivities as a fraction of fmn
characteristics that proxy for the potential hedging needs of a fum.

For another perspective on

this issue, we next directly estimate fmns' market value exposures to interest rates and currency

exchange rates, and examine the extent to which fmns ' derivatives portfolios potentially hedge
these exposures.

We report estimated market-based exposures in Table 5 and scaled sensitivities

in Table 6. The analysis below ignores exposure to commodity prices because a relatively small
fraction of the sample fmns uses commodity derivatives and fnms do not consistently report all
of the commodity prices to which they face risk exposure.
Table 5 reports sample fmns ' market-based exposures to interest rates and exchange
rates, and volatility of market value of equity.

To estimate interest-rate and exchange-rate

exposures, we regress monthly stock returns on the monthly change in the 6-month T-hill yield,
the monthly percentage change in the Federal Reserve's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar
Index, and the monthly return on the CRSP value-weighted market index (for similar procedures,
see Wong, 2000; Guay, 1999; and Hentschel and Kothari, 2001).

We estimate the regressions

separately for each sample fum using data for the 3 years ending December 1997.

We defme

estimated interest rate exposure as the product of the absolute value of the regression coefficient
on the interest rate variable multiplied by a 3.4 percentage point change in the 6-month T-hill
yield, which serves as an extreme change in the interest rate.

Since the regression coefficient is

estimated using fmns' stock returns as the dependent variable, the exposure calculated as above
is denominated in percentage of the market value of equity, i.e., stock return.

Similarly, the FX

exposure is the absolute value of the regression coefficient on the FX variable times 33% change
in the Federal Reserve's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar Index.
exposures, we also report dollar exposures.

In addition to return

Dollar exposures are equal to the return exposures

multiplied by the market value of equity at December 1997.
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Results in Table 5 reveal that the sample fmns' median market-based exposure to a three
standard deviation change in interest rates is quite substantial at 25%, or in dollar terms, $0.83
billion.

The fmns' FX exposures are smaller than the interest rate exposures, but nevertheless

quite substantial. The median FX exposure is 17% of the market value of equity or $0.46 billion.
Note that because the estimates of interest-rate and FX exposures are net of any hedging
activities, our measures underestimate the fmns' core exposures to interest rates and exchange
rates. We recognize that our tests may be hampered by estimation error in our measures of
interest rate and exchange rate exposures. To examine the severity of this concern, we perform
two sensitivity tests: (i) using only fums with statistically significant interest rate and exchange
rate exposures, and (ii) using only fums with exposure coefficients that are in the top quartile
with respect to the precision of the estimates (i.e., regression coefficients with standard errors in
the lowest quartile). The inference from these sensitivity tests is the same as the inference from
the reported results.

[Table 5]
We defme fums' exposure to stock-return volatility as the annualized standard deviation
of fums' monthly stock returns over the

~year

period ending December 1997. The dollar stock-

return volatility is the annualized standard deviation of monthly returns multiplied by the market
value of equity at December 1997. Table 5 shows that the sample fums ' exposures measured in
terms of stock-return volatility are comparable to interest-rate exposures.

Firms' annualized

stock-return volatility is on average 300/o and the median is 26%.
Table 6 scales the market value sensitivities of the fmns' derivative securities by the
estimated dollar exposures to interest rates and exchange rates, and the dollar volatility of market
value of equity. The median scaled sensitivities to IR and FX exposures are 0.03 and 0.06,
respectively. The scaled sensitivities reflect the fraction of the change in stockholder value that
would be offset by derivatives in the event of a shock to asset prices. For the scaled interest rate
measure, the numerator includes only the market value sensitivity from interest rate derivatives.
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Similarly, for the scaled exchange rate measure, the numerator includes only the market value
sensitivity from FX derivatives. The market value sensitivity for all derivative securities are
included in the numerator of the scaled market value of equity volatility measure.
As mentioned above, since estimated exposures are net exposures as opposed to core

exposures, they impart an upward bias into the scaled sensitivities.

The reason is that, assuming

market efficiency, net exposures are smaller than core exposures because they already reflect the
hedging consequences of the fmns ' derivatives portfolio.

In spite of this bias in favor of the

magnitudes of scaled sensitivities, the scaled sensitivities are small for most of the sample fmns.
These fmdings suggest that derivative securities are unlikely to have a significant impact on
entity level interest-rate exposures, the exchange-rate exposures, or the stock return volatility.
Note that our inference is with respect to entity-level exposures as opposed to

transaction-level exposures. Entity-level risk exposures subsume transaction-level exposures but
also include operational risk exposures such as supply, demand

and competitive effects related

to changes in interest rates or exchange rates. We make no statements about the portion of a
particular type of transaction-based exposure that is hedged, such as the fraction of foreign sales
hedged with exchange rate derivatives or the portion of variable-rate debt that is hedged with
interest rate derivatives. It is possible that contracting costs or the desire to qualify for hedge
accounting treatment drive some fnms to engage in transaction-level hedging. Our data simply
suggest that if fmns do hedge a large portion of these transaction-level exposures, then the
transaction-level exposures make up a relatively small fraction of finns' overall market value
exposures to interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices. 11

[Table 6]

11

For example, Allayarmis and Weston (2001 ) use the notional amount of foreign currency derivativ es scaled by
foreign sales as a proxy for the amount of exchange-rate exposure hedged by their sample firms. They find that this
ratio averages 22%. Our results suggest that this hedge ratio overstates the amount exchange rate risk that firm
hedge with exchange rate derivatives, in large part because foreign sales fail to capture important elements of entitylevel exchange-rate exposure .
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4.4 Risk-management theories and cross-sectional variation in scaled sensitivities
In this section we examine cross-sectional variation in the intensity of derivatives use.

Evidence in the preceding sections indicate that most fmns' derivatives positions are nnlikely to
significantly reduce the volatility of fmn value or cash flows.

However, it is possible that the

intensity of derivatives use is economically large for firms with the greatest incentives to hedge
according to risk-management theories.

We therefore analyze the relation between variables that

proxy for the determinants of hedging and fmns ' scaled cash flow and market value sensitivities.
We also entertain the possibility that derivatives are used by fmns for other purposes, such as to
smooth income and/or to reduce contracting costs between the fmn and risk-averse employees.
An important feature of our inference that differs from previous research is that we emphasize

the magnitude, not simply the statistical significance of the relation between derivatives use and
determinants of hedging.

Proxy variables for determinants of hedging.

Based on the risk-management theories

discussed in section 2, we expect cash flow volatility, growth opportunities, and leverage to
proxy for firms' incentives to hedge.

We measure cash flow volatility as the average absolute

change in the ratio of annual cash flow from operations to assets from 1994-1997. We also use
an earnings-based volatility measure, calculated similar to the cash-flow-based measure, on the
premise that earnings represent a forecast of a fmn's future cash flow generating ability (see,
e.g., Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998). The market-to-book ratio of assets captures a fum ' s
growth opportunities.

Leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to the market value of assets

and serves as a proxy for the probability of frnancial distress.
We also examine fum size, segment diversification and geographic diversification. Finn
size, measured as book value of assets, proxies for the potentially greater benefits of hedging for
smaller fmns because the direct costs of distress do not increase proportionately with fmn size
(Warner, 1977). In addition, previous research shows that small fmns' earnings and cash flows
are more volatile than those of large fmns.

Segment and geographic diversification are crude
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proxtes for the degree of diversification of the sources of cash flows to the fum, suggesting a
negative correlation between these variables and the demand for hedging. We estimate segment
diversification with an entropy measure of total product diversification calculated from data on
the Compustat Industry Segments File and is defmed as L,Piln(l/Pi) where Pi is dollar sales of
principal product i scaled by total fum sales.

Geographic diversification is also an entropy

measure calculated from data on the Compustat Geographic Segments File and equal to
L,Giln(l/Gi) where Gi is dollar sales represented by geographic segment i scaled by total fum

sales. We also include the cash and marketable securities variable described in Table 2.
Substantial holdings of cash and marketable securities can act as alternative means of risk
management by providing the fum with a buffer against cash shortfalls.
Firm size, segment diversification, and geographic diversification might also spur the
demand for derivatives by managers because of contracting reasons. Large, diversified fnms are
more likely to be multi-divisional.

At the divisional

leve~

variation in profits or revenues due to

variation in fmancial prices may be uninformative about managers' performance. If the costs of
writing contracts to remove this variation are large, fums might rationally allow lower-level
managers to smooth performance with derivatives, even though these positions are not large
enough to significantly hedge entity-level risk. These fums' managers might engage in hedging
to smooth out their divisional performance.

Thus, whereas diversified sources of cash flows for

these fums would suggest less intensive demand for derivatives, agency considerations would
predict these fums to use derivatives more intensively.
A related contracting argument also applies to top executives, such as the CEO. Optimal
contracts written between fums and their executives often impose risk on the executive through
stock-based and accounting-based performance measures. The cost of these contracts to the fum
increases with the noise in the performance measures. To reduce contracting costs, fums may
allow executives to remove uncontrollable market risks through hedging with derivatives. We
use two proxies to capture executives' incentives to mitigate uncontrollable market risks through
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hedging with derivatives. The frrst variable is a measure of stock-based incentives computed as
the sensitivity of the value of a CEO's stock and option portfolio to a one percent change in stock
price. We estimate the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price using the method
described in Core and Guay (2000) and data from the Execucomp database. The second variable
is a measure of the CEO's incentives from annual bonuses. This variable is defined as total cash
bonus paid to the CEO over the previous three years as a fraction of the total pay to the CEO
over the same period. 12 Total pay includes cash pay plus grants of restricted stock, options and
other annual compensation, and is calculated using data from the Execucomp database and from
proxy statements for fmns not listed on Execucomp.

Evidence on cross-sectional variation in hedging intensity.
To explore how the intensity of derivatives use varies with hypothesized determinants,
we partition the fmns that use derivatives into quintiles based on the proxy variables described
above.

Table 7 reports median scaled sensitivities for the frrst, third, and ftfth quintiles of the

proxy variables.

Although we report results for only three of the scaled sensitivities (i.e., market

value sensitivity scaled by assets, cash flow sensitivity scaled by three year average investing
cash flows, and cash flow sensitivity scaled by the largest absolute change in net income during
the previous three years), the results are similar for the remaining scaled sensitivity measures.
[Table 7]
Table 7 indicates that the scaled sensitivities are not large for most of the quintile
rankings. In no quintile does the median firm's market value sensitivity exceed 3.2% of assets. In
the columns where hedging intensity is defmed as scaled cash flow sensitivity, the median values
are generally small, in most cases less than 0.30.

Some of the hedging proxy variables are

correlated with derivatives intensity in the direction predicted by theory. For example, hedging
intensity increases with the ratio of market value to book value of assets across the quintiles.

12

We recognize that this variable measures managers' incentives to smooth earnings with error because it does not
incorporate the influence ofnon-linearities in the shape of the bonus scheme.
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However, while a positive correlation between hedging intensity and proxtes for the incentives
to hedge is consistent with risk management theory, such a fmding is not sufficient to conclude
that derivative securities are an economically important component of ftrms' hedging programs.
The largest median scaled cash flow sensitivity in Table 7 is 0.47 for the quintile of ftrms
with the greatest geographic diversification (when the scaling variable is the largest absolute
change in net income during the previous three years). In fact, geographic diversification exhibits
the strongest and most consistent relation with derivatives intensity across the columns in Table
7. A potential confounding issue is that ftrm size also exhibits a consistent positive relation with
derivatives intensity and larger ftrms are expected to be more diversified.

In Table 8, we rank

ftrms ftrst into quintiles by size, and then within each size quintile by above and below median
geographic diversification to explore whether ftrm size influences the observed relation between
diversiftcation

and

derivatives

intensity.

The

results

clearly

suggest

that

geographic

diversiftcation, and not size, is strongly positively related to derivatives intensity. In each size
quintile,

ftrms

with

above

median

geographic

diversification

exhibit

significantly

higher

derivatives intensity, and in several cases, the magnitude of the median ftrm's derivatives
intensity is quite large.

[Table 8]
Multivariate regressiOns of derivatives intensity on the proxtes for hedging incentives in
Table 9 support the obsetVed importance of geographic diversification in explaining derivatives
intensity. These regressions use cash flow and market value sensitivities scaled by assets as the
dependent variables. In each speciftcation, geographic diversification is the only variable with a
coefficient that is significantly different from zero. The coefficients on cash and marketable
securities and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price are in the predicted direction and
marginally signiftcant. Alternative regression specifications that use other scaled sensitivities
from Table 4 as the dependent variable yield similar results. The results are also similar for a
tobit specification that includes the non derivatives users as a way to control for self-selection
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tssues. When the interest rate and exchange rate exposures reported m Table 5 are included as
independent variables, their coefficients

are generally negative and marginally significant,

suggesting that fmns with greater exposure to interest rates and exchange rates have lower
derivatives intensity. However, none of the other results are altered when these variables are
included.

[Table 9]

5.

Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we examme the hypothesis that fmancial derivatives are an economically

important component of corporate risk management While previous research explores whether
the corporate use of derivatives is consistent with theories of hedging, none of the previous
studies documents large-sample evidence on the magnitude of a firm's risk exposure hedged by
the financial derivatives. Absent such evidence, it is difficult to assess the importance of
corporations' fmancial derivatives portfolios in managing risk
For a random sample of 234 large non-fmancial corporations, we present detailed
evidence on the cash flow and market value sensitivities of financial derivative portfolios to
extreme changes in the underlying assets' prices.

That is, for simultaneous extreme changes m

interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices, we estimate (i) the dollar amount of cash
flow that a firm would derive from its derivatives portfolio; and (ii) the change in the market
value of the firm 's derivatives portfolio. The median (75th percentile) firm's cash flow sensitivity
to extreme changes in the underlying assets' prices is $15 ($85) million, and the market value

sensitivity is $31 ($129) million. For most of the sample ftrms, these cash flow and market value
sensitivities are small relative to the magnitude of traditional measures of economic exposures,
or operating and investing cash flow measures. For example, the median ftrm holds derivative
securities that, even under very generous assumptions, could hedge only 3% to 6% of its
aggregate interest-rate and currency exchange rate exposures. Our inferences in this respect are
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broadly consistent across a variety of economic measures that capture different aspects of fnms
risk exposures.
Our results suggest that the magnitude of the derivatives positions taken by most fnms is
economically small in relation to their typical risk exposures. Maintaining an economically small
derivatives program is potentially consistent with fums: i) using derivatives to ''fine tune" their
overall risk-management program that likely includes other means of hedging (e.g., operational
hedges

through

diversified

derivatives use (e.g.,

manufacturing

sites),

ii)

divisional decision making) for

making

decentralized

decisions

on

internal budgeting or performance

evaluation putposes, or iii) usmg derivatives for putposes other than risk-management (e.g., to
speculate on asset prices).
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Appendix A

Intel Corporation, Footnotes to Financial Statements for 1997
Derivative financial instruments
Out s t a ndi n g not i ona l
we r e a s follows :

amoun t s f o r de r i va t i v e fi n a ncia l

I n mil l i ons )

Swa ps h e dg i n g inv e stments i n debt secu r it i e s
Swa ps h e dg i n g inv e stments in e qu i ty s e curit ies
Swa ps h e dg i n g debt
Cu r rency fo rward c ont racts
Cu r re n c y opt i ons
Option s he d g i ng investment s
l n ma r ket a b l e equ ity s ec u r i t i es

ins t rume n t s a t

fis cal y e a r-e nd s

1 9 97

$
$
$
$
$

2 ,0 1 7
6 04
1 55
1 ,7 2 4
55

$

1 9 96

$
$
$
$
$

900
91 8
456
1 , 49 9
94

$

82

Wh i le t h e cont r ac t or n otion a l amounts p r ovi d e one me a s ur e of th e v o lume of th e s e
t r a ns a c ti o n s , t hey d o n ot rep r es e nt t he amou nt of the Compa ny ' s e x posure to credit
r isk . The amo u n t s pot e n t i al l y s u b j ec t
t o credi t
risk ar i s i ng f rom t he pos s i ble
i n a bi l i t y of count e rpa r t ies to me et t h e terms o f t heir contracts ) are g e nera l ly l i mi t ed
t o th e a mounts , i f any , by whi ch t h e c o unterpa r ti e s ' o b l i gat i ons exce e d the obli gations
of the Compan y . The Company controls c r edi t risk t h rough credit app r ovals, l i mits and
mo nitor i ng p r o ced u r e s . Cr e dit rat i ng c r i t er i a f o r off- b a lance - s h e e t transact i ons a r e
s i milar to t h o se f o r investment s .
Swap ag r e e me n t s. The Compa ny u t iliz e s s wap agr e ement s t
c u r rency, equ i t y and i n t eres t ra te r eturns of i t s investment
f l oati n g U. S . dol l ar i n tere s t rat e bas ed r e t u rns . The f loa t i ng
primari l y on U. S . dol l a r LI BOR and are reset o n a mont h l y ,
b a sis .

o e x c hange the fore i g n
and debt p o rtfo l ios f o r
r a t es on swaps are bas e d
q u a r te r ly or semiannu a l

Pa y r at e s o n swap s hed g i ng i nvestment s i n debt secur i t i es match t h e yie l d s on t h e
underly i ng inv e stmen ts t hey h edge . Pa yme nt s o n swaps h e d ging inves tments i n e qui t y
s e curi t i es ma tch t h e e qu i ty return s on the under l y i ng i nves tment s t hey h e dg e. Re ce i v e
r a t es o n s wa p s h edg i n g debt ma tch t h e expense o n t h e unde r l ying d e bt t h e y hedge .
Ma t ur i ty d at es o f s waps ma tch t h o se of t h e u nder l y i ng inv estme nt o r the d e bt they
h e d ge . Th ere i s app r o xima t el y a o n e -t o - one matching o f s waps t o i nv es tme n t s and deb t .
Swap a greements r emain in effect unt i l expiration .
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We i ght e d ave r a g e p a y a nd r e ce i v e rat e s , a v e r ag e matur i t i e s
s wa ps a t Dec e mbe r 27 , 1 99 7 we re a s f o l lows :

We i gh t ed
av e r a ge
p ay r a t e
Swa p s h e dg i n g inv e stme n t s
i n u . s . dol l ar d e bt
s e cur i t ie s
Swa ps h e dg i n g inv e stme n t s
i n for e ign c ur r e n cy
d e bt s e cu r i t i es
Swa ps h e dg i n g inv e stme n ts
i n e q u i ty s e c u r i t ie s
Swa p s h e dg i n g d e b t

We i ght e d
a ve r a g e
r e cei v e
r at e

a nd r a n ge of matur i t i e s

We igh ted
a v e ra ge
ma t u ri t y

on

Ran g e o f
ma turi t ie s

6 . 1%

5 . 8%

. 9 ye ar s

0 - 3 y e ar s

6 . 3%

5 . 9%

1. 0 ye a r s

0 - 3 y e ar s

N/ A
5 . 9%

5 . 7%
5 . 2%

. 6 ye a r s
1.6 y ear s

0 - 2 y e ar s
0 - 11 y e ar s

No t e : P a y a n d r e c eive r at e s a re b a sed on t h e re s et r a t es t h at were i n ef f ect a t
De c emb e r 27, 1 99 7 .
Othe r f o r eig n c u r r enc y i n strume nt s. I n t el tran s ac t s b u s i ne s s i n v a r ious for eig n
c u r ren c i es , p rima r ily J apane se y e n and c er t a i n ot h er As i a n and Eu rope a n curr e ncies . Th e
Compan y h as e s t ab l i s hed r evenu e and b a l ance she e t h edg i n g p r og rams t o pr ot ect a g ai n s t
r e d uct i ons i n v al u e a nd v o l at i l i ty o f f u t ure c a sh f l ows c a u s ed b y c han ge s in fore i g n
e x c h ang e r a t e s . Th e Comp a ny u t il i z e s c u r r enc y f orwa r d c o nt r a c ts a n d c u r r enc y opt ions i n
t h e se h e d gi n g p rog r ams . Th e mat u r i ti e s on t h e s e i n s t r ume n ts a r e l es s t h a n 1 2 mo nt h s .
De f erred g a i n s or los s e s a t t ribut able to f o r ei g n currency i n struments ar e not ma teri a l .
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Fair values of financial instruments
Th e est i ma ted f a i r
we r e a s fo l lows :

values of fina n cial instruments o uts t a ndi n g

1 997

Carry ing
amo u n t

I n mi l l i ons )

Ca s h a n d c a s h e q u i va l e nts
Sh o rt - t erm i nvestments
Tr a d ing as s e t s
Lo n g -t e r m i nv e s t ments
No n - ma r k et a b l e i n s trume nt s
Swa ps h e dg i n g inv e stments
i n d e b t s e c u r it i e s
Swa ps h e dg i n g inv e stments
i n e q u i ty s e cur i t ie s
Op t ions hedgi ng i nve s t ment s in
ma rket a ble e qui t y securit i e s
Short- t e rm d e bt
Lo ng-t e r m d e bt r e d eema b le
within one yea r
Lo n g -t e r m d ebt
Swa ps h e dg i n g debt
Currency forward c ont r a ct s
Cu r ren c y o p t i ons

$ 4 , 1 02
$ 5,5 6 1
1 95
$
$ 1, 8 2 1
3 87
$

at

fi s c a l

yea r-ends

19 96

Est i mated
fa i r
va l ue

Car r y i ng
amou nt

Es t imated
fair
v a lue

$ 4 , 10 2
$ 5 , 56 1
$
19 5
$ 1 , 82 1
497
$

$ 4 f 165
$ 3, 736
87
$
$ 1 f 4 18
1 19
$

$ 4,165
$ 3,73 6
87
$
$ 1, 4 1 8
194
$

$

64

$

64

$

12)

$

12 )

$

8

$

8

$

27 )

$

27 )

$
$

212 )

$
$

21 2 )

$
$

25 )
389)

$
$

25 )
389 )

$
$

110 )
4 48 )

$
$

$
$

728)

$
$

$
$
$

$

26
1

$
$

1 09 )
44 8 )
1)
28
1

$
$
$

$

5

$
$

731 )
13
18

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix B
For simultaneous extreme changes in interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices,
we estimate for each sample fnm: (i) the dollar amount of cash flow that a fnm would derive
from its derivatives portfolio, referred to as the cash flow sensitivity; and (ii) the change in the
market value of the fum's derivatives portfolio, referred to as the market value sensitivity. We
describe this estimation procedure below for each class of derivative security.
Foreign currency derivatives
For foreign currency derivatives, an extreme change is defmed as a 33% change in the
currency exchange rate. A 33% change equals three times the average historical standard
deviation of annualized percentage changes in the US dollar exchange rate for the ten most
heavily-weighted currencies in the Federal Reserve's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar Index.
The annualized standard deviations are computed using quarterly observations over the 10-yr
period from 1988 through 1997.
FX forwards
The cash flow and market value sensitivities of an FX forward contract to a 33% change
in the currency exchange rate are estimated as:
($ notional principal) x 33%.
Because FX forwards almost invariably have maturities of a year or less, we assume the market
value and cash flow sensitivities to be the same.

For forward contracts that mature in less than

one year, the assumed 33% change likely overstates a three standard deviation shock to exchange
rates.
FX options
Market value sensitivity and cash flow sensitivity of an FX option to a 33% change m
currency is estimated as:
($ notional principal) x 33%
Again, because FX options tend to have maturities of a year or less, we assume the
market value and cash flow sensitivities to be the same.
Our sensitivity measure overestimates the actual sensitivity of most of the options
because the computation assumes that all options are "deep in the money'' (i.e., an option delta of
one). For example, if the option is substantially out-of-the-money, the dollar sensitivity of option
value to exchange rate movements is very small.

The sensitivity of an option approaches the
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sensitivity of a fotward contract (i.e., sensitivity of one) in the limit as it moves deep in the
money. Because the strike price is rarely disclosed in the Form lOK footnotes, it is not possible
to precisely estimate the option sensitivity with public data. While the time-to-maturity of the
options is sometimes disclosed, this information alone is not sufficient to accurately estimate
option sensitivity. Therefore, we assume all options have the maximum possible sensitivity.
FX swaps

Market value sensitivity of an FX swap to a 33% change in the currency exchange rate is
estimated as:
($ notional principal) x 33%
The rationale is as follows. From Hull (1997),
Value of swap= (S x BF)- BD
where
S = spot exchange rate expressed as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency,
BF =the value, measured in the foreign currency, of the foreign-denominated bond underlying
the swap, and
BD =the value of the U.S. dollar bond underlying the swap.
Therefore, assuming
Bp = BD = notional principal of the swap in $US,

then
Market value sensitivity of FX swap = ($ notional principal) x 33%
This should roughly be true when the firm first enters into the swap smce the interest
rates on swaps are likely to be set so that each bond trades at par. However, as exchange rates
and interest rates change over time, the above assumption will no longer be valid for all fnms.
Though, on average, it might still hold approximately.
Cash flow sensitivity of an FX swap to a 33% change in the currency exchange rate is
estimated as :
Cash Flow Sensitivity ofFX swap = ($ notional principal) x 8% x 33%

In a plain vanilla currency swap, the parties to the swap exchange interest payments m
two foreign currencies each period and swap back the principal payments in the two foreign
currencies at the maturity of the swap. Therefore, the sensitivity of the annual cash flows from a
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foreign currency swap to a giVen change in exchange rates depends on the size of the interest
payment and the magnitude of the change in exchange rates. Because the interest rate Wlderlying
currency swaps is rarely disclosed in the lOK report, we assume that foreign currencies are
swapped by all fmns at an interest rate of 8%. This interest rate is larger than the interest rates
on Treasury bills and five-year US bonds in effect at 12131197 (or at any time in the three-year
period leading up to this date), and therefore is not likely to Wlderestimate the cash flow
sensitivity ofFX swaps held by the sample fnms.
We include foreign exchange interest rate swaps in this group. These are currency swaps
that also swap fixed for floating interest rates and vice versa, in addition to the swap of
currenctes.

For these swaps, the estimated FX sensitivity is like a comparative static.

measures the sensitivity to exchange rates holding interest rates constant

It

The sensitivity of this

swap to exchange rates is computed just like the standard FX swaps above. However, since the
value and cash flows of this type of swap are also sensitive to changes in interest rates, we
include them in theIR sensitivity computations below as well.
Interest rate derivatives
We measure market value (cash flow) sensitivity of IR derivatives to interest rate
movements as the estimated change in IR derivatives' value (annual cash flow) for a 3.4
percentage point change in the 6-month yield on T-bills. The choice of 3.4 percentage points
reflects a 3 standard deviation change in the annualized percentage point change in the 6-month
T-hill yield using quarterly observations over the 10-yr period from 1988 through 1997.
IR swaps
Cash flow sensitivity of an IR swap to 3.4% change in interest rates is estimated as:
Cash flow sensitivity of an IR swap=($ notional principal) x 3.4%.

In a plain vanilla interest rate swap, each party either pays or receives a cash flow equal
to a floating interest rate times the notional principal of the swap. Therefore, when interest rates
change, the change in periodic cash flows equals the notional principal multiplied by the change
in interest rates.
Market value sensitivity of an IR swap to 3.4% change m interest rates 1s estimated as
follows. From Hull (1997),
Value of swap = Bnoating - Bfixed
where
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Bfloating =the value of the floating-rate bond underlying the swap, and

=the value ofthe ftxed-rate bond underlying the swap.

Bfixed

Assume
Bfloating = &xed = notional principal of the swap
Bfloating always equals notional principal immediately after a payment date.

Since the

swap normally has a value of zero at initiation, Brixed should be equal to notional principal at
initiation. Of course, this equality will generally not be true during the life of the swap. Though,
on average, it might still hold approximately. Given this assumption,
Market value sensitivity of an IR swap = Change in &xed for a 3.4% change in interest
rates
To compute this sensitivity, we must assume the fiXed coupon rate that underlies the
swap and the prevailing interest rates that should be used to discount the bond's cash flows.

A

random sampling of about 150 companies reveals that 40% of the sample fums provide
information about the interest rates underlying their swaps.

In these cases, the coupon rates

almost always fall between 5.5% and 6.5%.
We assume that the coupon rate and discount rate are both equal to 6% for all swaps, all
fums, and all maturities.

We then perturb the discount rate by ±3.4%, to 2.6% and 9.4%, and

compute the aggregate value of each fum's swaps at each of these discount rates. The average
absolute value of the outstanding swaps computed at these two discount rates is taken as the
interest rate sensitivity of the derivatives.
While most ftrms disclose the time to maturity of their swaps, some disclose a range of
maturities, and others make no disclosure at all.

For the fums that report a range of maturities,

we take the midpoint of the range as the time-to-maturity. For companies that do not disclose
anything, we assume a time-to-maturity of 5 years, which is the average swap maturity for the
fmns that do provide disclosure.
We also include the IRJFX swaps when computing interest rate sensitivities. As indicated
above, these are IR swaps that also swap currencies.
sensitivity is like a comparative static.
exchange rates constant

Here, as with the FXIIR swap, the

It measures the sensitivity to interest rates holding

The sensitivity of this swap to exchange rates is computed just like the

standard IR swaps above. Since this type of swap is also sensitive to changes in exchange rates,
we include them in the FX sensitivity computations above.
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IR forwards
We assume each forward contract is written on a 5-yr Treasury note with notional
principal equal to the disclosed notional principal. We assume the fmn holds the 5 yr note and
estimate the cash flow sensitivity of the forward

a;;

the cash flow from the forward as a result of

a 3.4% change in interest rates. Similar to our computations for interest-rate swaps, we assume
that the initial discount rate on the note is 6% for all IR forwards. The initial value of the note is
assumed to be equal to [$notional principal I 1.06)5 ]. We then perturb the interest rate by ±3.4%,
to 2.6% and 9.4%, and compute the change in value of the notes at each of these discount rates.
The average absolute change in value for the notes computed at these two discount rates is taken
as the interest rate sensitivity of the IR forward derivatives. Because IR forwards held by our
sample firms almost invariably mature within a year, we assume the market value and cash flow
sensitivities to be the same.
We include the three sample fmns with IR options m this group as well.

As with the

forwards, we assume the options are written on a 5-yr Treasury note. As with the FX options,

this sensitivity measure should overestimate the ''true" sensitivity because our computation is
appropriate only for options that are "deep in the money".
IR Caps, IR Floors, IR Collars
Caps, floors, and collars are similar to swaps except that the swap payments occur only
when interest rates are above (caps and collars) or below (floors and collars) some pre-specified
interest rate. To compute an upper bound on the cash flow sensitivity, we assume that all caps,
floors and collars are deep in the money. Under this assumption, if the interest rate changes by
3.4%, the annual cash flow from the cap changes by [3.4%

*

$ notional principal]. As such, we

estimate the cash flow sensitivity of the cap, floor, or collar as 3.4%

*

notional principal.

The

estimation of market value sensitivity is more complicated because caps, floors, and collars are
generally bundles of options that have staggered times to maturity.

For example, a 5-year cap

might be made up of 20 caplet options that expire each quarter. To compute an upper bound on
the market value sensitivity, we again assume that all the caplets are deep in the money and that
the annual cash flow from the cap changes by [3.4%

*

$ notional principal] when interest rates

change by 3.4%. Thus, the market value sensitivity of the cap is the present value of an annuity,
where the cash flow is equal to [3.4%

*

$ notional principal], and the length of the annuity is the
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time-to-maturity of the cap, floor, or collar. While a collar is the combination of a put option and
a call option and specifies an upper and lower interest rate, only one of the options, either the put
or the call, can be deep in-the-money at a given time. Therefore, the method used for caps and
floors is a reasonable upper bound on the sensitivity of collars.
Commodity derivatives
The cash flow sensitivity of commodity derivatives to commodity pnce movements 1s
measured as the estimated change in commodity derivatives' annual cash flow for a 37% change
in the underlying commodity price. A majority of the commodity derivatives used by our sample
fmns are written over some form of fuel-related resource, e.g., crude oil and natural gas.

The

choice of 37% reflects a three-standard-deviation change in the annualized percentage return on
the quarterly Producer Price Index for Fuel over the 10-yr period from January 1988 through
December 1997. An alternative choice for the commodity index would be a more general index,
such as the Producer Price Index for All Commodities.

However, because this index reflects a

portfolio of commodity prices, its volatility is far lower than the volatility of a single commodity
index.

For example, annualized standard deviation of the All Commodities Index from 1/88

through 12/97 is 2% versus 12.4% for the Fuel Index, though the correlation between these two
indexes is high at 0.81. We choose the more volatile Fuel Index to avoid underestimating the
sensitivity of the commodity derivatives positions.
Using the same logic described above for FX derivatives, the cash flow sensitivity of the
commodity forwards and options for a 37% change in the price of the underlying commodity is
estimated as:
Cash flow sensitivity of commodity forward = $ notional principal x 37%.
Because the commodity forwards and options held by our sample fmns tend to mature in
less than one year, we assume that the market value sensitivity of these securities is the same as
their cash flow sensitivity.
For commodity swaps, the disclosed notional principal is the total quantity of the
commodity swapped over the duration of the swaps held.

The cash flow sensitivity varies

somewhat over time depending upon the total quantity of the commodity swapped during each
fiscal period. For simplicity, we assume that notional quantity swapped each year is equal to the
total notional quantity swapped divided by the number of years until all the swaps mature.
Therefore, the cash flow sensitivity of commodity swaps is estimated as:
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Cash flow sensitivity of commodity swap

[$ notional principal x 37%] I maturity m

years.
Since the notional principal represents the total quantity of commodity swapped over the
duration of the swap, the market value sensitivity is estimated as:
Market value sensitivity of commodity swap= [$notional principal x 37%]

For approximately 35% of the sample fnms using commodity derivatives, the notional
principal is stated in units of the underlying commodity instead of dollars.

Some fmns disclose

units and price per unit, thus providing sufficient information to compute notional values.

If

only units are reported, we approximate the notional principal using commodity prices prevailing
at the end of 1997.
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Table 1
Sam pie Characteristics
Descriptive statistics on

All firms

Derivatives users

Derivatives non-users

All figure;; in $millions

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

l\fV equity

5877

1673

8571

2376

2384

1145

Assets

5224

1496

7226

2050

2632

1118

3-yr avg. CFO

502

127

735

178

201

86

3-yr avg. NI

219

59

3 18

74

91

52

3-yr avg. cash + mkt. securities

253

55

374

71

93

41

3-yr avg. PPE expenditures

316

91

454

136

138

59

3-yr avg. investing CF

455

135

637

178

221

106

3-yr avg. interest expense

123

33

169

50

61

23

3-yr avg. absolute change in CFO

125

40

194

62

57

30

3-yr max. absolute change in CFO

241

67

349

104

101

48

3-yr avg. absolute change in NI

93

30

139

44

48

17

3-yr max. absolute change in NI

168

44

230

74

88

27

# offnms

413

234

179

The sample consists of 413 firms selected uniformly from the 1000 largest firms on Compustat, ranked by maiket value of equity on December 31st, 1995. The
descriptive statisti cs are reported for the fiscal year ending December, 1997. MV Equity is common shares outstanding at year end multiplied by stock price at year
end (Compustat #24 x Compustat #25). Assets is book value of assets at year end (Compustat #6). Three-year Avg. (x) is the average of variable x using data for the
three years leading up to fiscal year end 1997 when firms' derivatives positions are taken from the Form 10-K filings. CFO is cash from operating activities
(Compustat #308). NI is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). Interest Expense is interest expense (Compustat #15). Firms with no interest
expense in the year leading up to the date of derivatives measm ement i.e., no interest bearing debt in year t) are excluded under the assumption that these firms have
no reason to use derivatives to hedge interest expense in year t. Cash +Mkt Secmities is cash and short -term investments at year-end (Compustat #1). PPE
Expenditmes is capital expenditmes (Compustat #30). Investing CF is cash flows from investing activities (Compustat #311). Absolute Change in CFO: Change in
annual CFO (Compustat #308); tlu-ee annual absolute changes are calculated using fom annual CFO observations leading up to the date of derivatives measmement.
Absolute Change in NI is calculated using income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18).
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics on derivative positions
Notional Principal in $million
Type of derivative

Maturity in years

#of
users

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Q1

Median

Q3

Max

Mean

Std. Dev.

FX forwards/futures

124

442.7

11 00.5

0.6

12. 1

68.4

403.5

95 11.0

1.2

0.6

FX swaps

33

428.1

625.7

0.7

65.0

243. 1

441.0

2874.0

4 .8

4 .2

FX options

27

290.5

387.4

6.0

42.8

202.9

354.7

1537.0

1.4

0.8

143

537.5

1236 .7

0. 6

22. 1

122.0

489.8

9561.0

2. 4

2.8

137

474.8

697.2

3.8

100.0

180.0

495.0

3678.0

5.0

5.6

lR caps

15

205.0

255.2

17.7

80.0

100.0

200.0

1003.4

4 .7

5.2

JR. forwards

9

367.8

458.7

50.0

85.0

200.0

350.0

1500.0

1.1

0.2

143

499.5

746.4

3.8

100.0

200.0

500.0

367 8.0

5.4

6.2

Comm odity forwards/futures

25

128.9

186. 8

0.5

2 1. 2

39.4

200.0

679.0

1.9

1.4

Commodity swaps

13

189.3

278.6

2.2

23.3

50.0

205.8

974.0

1.8

1.2

Commodity options

8

123.5

223.9

1.4

6.4

41.9

11 2.9

664 .0

1.5

0.8

36

190.6

243. 5

0.5

21.2

39.9

275.9

974.0

2.3

2.0

FX derivatives

All FX derivatives
IR derivatives
lR swaps

All IR derivatives
Commodity derivatives

All Commodity derivatives

The sample consists of 234 fitm s that report derivatives use for hedging purposes at fiscal year end 1997. This sample is obtained from a sample of 413 firms selected
lllllformly from the 1000 largest firms on Compustat, ranked by market value of equity on December 31st, 1995.
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Table 3
Cash flow and market value sensitivities of firms' derivatives portfolios at the end of 1997
Type of derivative

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Q1

Median

Q3

Maximum

Market value sensitivity,
$million
FX derivatives

108.4

330.2

0.0

0.0

3.6

61.1

3155.1

IR derivatives

39.4

88.9

0.0

0.0

4.2

34.1

676.0

Commodity derivatives

10.5

42.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

360.4

All derivatives

158.3

372.1

0.2

8.6

31.2

128.7

3422.9

Cash flow sensitivity,
$million
FX derivatives

90.1

286.8

0.0

0.0

3.0

41.3

3140.0

IR derivatives

11.6

26.3

0.0

0.0

2.3

10.3

244.8

Commodity derivatives

9.9

41.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

360.4

111.5

299.8

0.2

4.4

15.3

84.7

3238.8

All derivatives

Market value sensitivity of a firm's derivatives position is the change in the value of each derivatives security in the portfolio for a given change in the prices of
underlying assets. Cash flow sensitivity of a firm' s derivatives position is the change in the annual cash flow resulting from each derivative security in the portfolio for a
given change in the price of underlying asset (i.e., change in interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices). The sum of cash flow sensitivities or market value
sensitivities across all the derivative securities yields the cash flow sensitivity and market value sensitivity for the entire derivatives portfolio under the assumption that
prices of all the underlying assets simultaneously experience the assumed change (i.e., three standard deviations of annual changes). Details on this procedure are
provided in Appendix B.
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Table 4
Scaled cash flow and market value sensitivities of firms' derivatives portfolios at the end of 1997
Cash flow sensitivities are scaled by operating flow variables and market value sensitivities are scaled by the market value of equity or the
fmn's book value of assets
Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Ql

Median

Q3

Maximum

Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I MV equity

0.04

0.09

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.04

1.15

Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I Assets

0.03

0.09

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.04

1.20

CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual CFO

0.58

2.98

0.00

0.03

0.10

0.27

30.23

CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual NI

0.84

2.74

0.00

0.07

0.19

0.53

34.95

CF Sens. from IR derivatives 13-yr avg. interest exp.

0.35

1.07

0.00

0.05

0.12

0.26

11.37

CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. Cash+ Mkt. Securities

1.18

2.67

0.00

0.06

0.28

1.23

27.37

CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual PPE expenditures

0.57

1.92

0.00

0.04

0.17

0.48

22.49

CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual Investing CF

0.40

1.22

0.00

0.03

0.09

0.34

15.08

CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual CFO

0.87

1.67

0.01

0.10

0.33

0.88

14.02

CF Sensitivity 13-yr max. absolute chg. in annual CFO

0.50

0.94

0.00

0.06

0.18

0.53

9.11

CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual NI

1.09

1.71

0.00

0.14

0.42

1.27

10.81

CF Sensitivity 13-yr max. absolute chg. in annual NI

0.65

0.96

0.00

0.09

0.25

0.74

6.46

Market value sensitivity of a finn's derivatives position is the change in the value of each derivatives security in the portfolio for a given change in the prices of
underlying assets. Cash flow sensitivity of a firm' s derivatives position is the change in the annual cash flow resulting from each derivative security in the portfolio for a
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given change in the price of underlying asset (i.e., change in interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices). The sum of cash flow sensitivities or market value
sensitivities across all the derivative securities yields the cash flow sensitivity and market value sensitivity for the entire derivatives portfolio under the assumption that
prices of all the underlying assets simultaneously experience the assumed change (i.e., three standard deviations of annual changes). Details on this procedure are
provided in Appendix B.
MV Equity is common shares outstanding at year end multiplied by stock price at year end (Compustat #24 x Compustat #25). Assets is book value of assets at year end
(Compustat #6). Three-year Avg. (x) is the average of variable x using data for the three years leading up to fiscal year end 1997 when firms' derivatives positions are
taken from the Form 10-K filings. CFO is cash from operating activities (Compustat #308). NI is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). Interest
Expense is interest expense (Compustat #15). Firms with no interest expense in the year leading up to the date of derivatives measurement i.e., no interest bearing debt
in year t) are excluded under the assumption that these firms have no reason to use derivatives to hedge interest expense in year t. Cash+ Mkt Securities is cash and
short-term investments at year-end (Compustat #1). PPE Expenditures is capital expenditures (Compustat #30). Investing CF is cash flows from investing activities
(Compustat #311). Absolute Change in CFO: Change in annual CFO (Compustat #308); three annual absolute changes are calculated using four annual CFO
observations leading up to the date of derivatives measurement. Absolute Change in NI is calculated using income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18).
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Table 5
Stock-return-based exposures

Interest rate exposure in percent of market value of equity

Interest rate exposure in dollars of market value of equity

FX exposure in percent of market value of equity

FX exposure in dollars of market value of equity
Stock-return volatility: annualized standard deviation
of monthly returns

Stock-retum volatility: expected annualized standard deviation
of the market value of equity

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

0.33

0.29

0.24

$2939 mil

$8258mil

$825 mil

0.25

0.25

0.17

$1748 mil

$3988mil

$458 mil

0.30

0.15

0.26

$2068 mil

$4746 mil

$627 mil

The regression model for estimating interest rate and exchange rate exposures is R.t = a + bt f1 T-Bill rat~+ b2% f1 FXt + b3 Rnt +!>it· Interest rate and FX exposures are
reported only for those firms holding interest rate and FX derivatives, respectively. Interest rate exposure in percent of market value of equity is the absolute value of the
coefficient from a three-year regression of monthly stock returns on the monthly percentage change in the 6-month T -bill rate (b 1 in the regression model) multiplied by
a 3.4% change in 6-month T-bill rate. Interest rate exposure in dollars of market value of equity is the interest rate exposure in percent of market value multiplied by the
market value of equity at the end of 1997. FX exposure in percent of market value of equity is the absolute value of the coefficient from a three-year regression of
monthly stock returns on the monthly percent change in the trade-weighted exchange index (b 2 in the regression model) multiplied by a 33% change in trade-weighted
exchange index. FX exposure in dollars of market value of equity is the FX exposure in percent of market value multiplied by the market value of equity at the end of
1997. Stock-return volatility: annualized standard deviation of monthly returns is computed over the three years leading up to December, 1997. Stock-return volatility:
expected annualized standard deviation of the market value of equity is the three year annualized standard deviation of monthly returns multiplied by the market value of
equity at the end of 1997.
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Table 6
Firms' derivative portfolios' market value sensitivities scaled by return-based exposures

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Ql

Median

Q3

Maximum

Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I IR exposure

0.29

1.53

0.00

0.01

0.03

0.12

17.08

Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I FX exposure

0.95

4.51

0.00

0.02

0.06

0.24

44.17

Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I Stock-return
volatility

0.10

0.1 9

0.00

0.01

0.04

0.12

1.82

Market value sensitivity of a firm' s derivatives position is the change in the value of each derivatives security in the portfolio for a given change in the prices of
underlying assets. The sum of market value sensitivities across all the derivative securities yields the market value sensitivity for the entire derivatives portfolio under
the assumption that prices of all the underlying assets simultaneously experience the assumed change (i.e., tlu·ee standard deviations of annual changes). Details on this
procedure are provided in Appendix B. IR exposure, FX exposure, and stock-return volatility are the interest rate exposure in dollars of market value of equity, FX
exposure in dollars of market value of equity, and the stock-return volatility: expected annualized standard deviation of the market value of equity as described and
summarized in Table 5.
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Table 7
Median scaled cash flow and market value sensitivities for first, third, and fifth quintiles of firm-year observations ranked
independently on determinants of hedging

Measure of hedging
~

Quintile of the proxy for
determinants ofhedging

Median Mkt. Cap.
Sensitivity I Assets

Median CF Sensitivity I 3-yr
avg. annual Investing CF

Median CF Sensitivity I
Largest absolute chg. in annual
NI from ~revious three ~ears

1st

3rd

5th

1st

3t·d

5th

1st

3rd

5th

Leverage

0.017

0.015

0.021

0.139

0.084

0.074

0.139

0.178

0.187

Market-to-book assets

0.016

0.015

0.022

0.052

0.111

0.171

0.167

0.187

0.211

0.012

0.019

0.018

0.054

0.093

0.146

0.190

0.254

0.190

0.012

0.018

0.025

0.081

0.110

0.321

0.411

0.171

0.126

Fraction of total pay as bonus

0.016

0.013

0.013

0.110

0.100

0.078

0.204

0.200

0.363

Cash + marketable securities

0.013

0.017

0.013

0.058

0.079

0.130

0.247

0.213

0.154

Sensitivity of wealth to stock
pnce

0.014

0.011

0.020

0.054

0.104

0.180

0.215

0.249

0.604

Assets

0.013

0.013

0.019

0.093

0.082

0.130

0.146

0.162

0.393

Segment diversification

0.015

0.018

0.013

0.074

0.140

0.110

0.260

0.186

0.166

Geographic diversification

0.010

0.008

0.032

0.045

0.071

0.256

0.113

0.108

0.471

Proxy variables for
determinants ofhedging

•

3-yr avg. absolute chg. in
annual (NI I assets)
3-yr avg. absolute chg. in
annual (CFO I assets)
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Fraction of total pay as bonus is total cash bonus paid to the CEO over the previous 3 years I total pay to the CEO over the previous 3 years. The sensitivity of wealth to
stock price is the sensitivity of the value of a CEO's stock and option portfolio to a one percent change in stock price. Total diversification is an entropy measure of total
product diversification calculated from data on the Compustat Industry Segments File and equal to I,P ,ln(JIP J where P, is dollar sales of principal product i scaled by
total firm sales. Geographic diversification is an entropy measure of geographic diversification calculated from data on the Compustat Geographic Segments File and
equal to L.Giln(JIGJ where Gi is dollar sales represented by geographic segment i scaled by total firm sales. All other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4.
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Table 8
Discriminating between firm size and geographic diversification as determinants of cash flow and market value sensitivities
Median Mkt. Cap.
Sensitivity I Assets

Geographic
diversification

Median CF Sensitivity 13year average annual
Investing CF

Median CF Sensitivity 13year average absolute
change in annual NI

Median CF Sensitivity I
Largest absolute change in
annual NI from previous
three ears

Below
median

Above
median

Below
median

Above
median

Below
median

Above
median

Below
median

Above
median

Smallest

0.01

0.01

0.07

0.18

0.24

0.54

0.10

0.19

2

0.02

0.02

0.05

0.14

0.44

0.68

0.21

0.41

3

0.01

0.02

0.05

0.15

0.49

0.16

0.14

0.17

4

0.00

0.02

0.03

0.20

0.14

0.58

0.07

0.28

Largest

0.01

0.03

0.07

0.26

0.25

1.32

0.17

0.50

~

Asset quintile~

Finns are ranked first into quintiles based on total assets and then ranked within each size quintile into above and below median geographic diversification. All variables
are defined in Tables 1, 2 and 7.
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Table 9
Regressions of cash flow and market value sensitivities on determinants of derivatives use
Predicted sign

Dependent variable(%)
Cash Flow Sensitivity Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity
I Assets
I Assets

Independent val'iables
Intercept

4.37
(1.01)

1.56
(0.93)

Leverage

+

-2.77
(-0. 87)

1.43
(1.1 6)

Market-to-book assets

+

-0.43
(-0.82)

0.25
(1.24)

-0.38
(-0.72)

-0.27
(-1.31)

Log(assets)
Segment diversification

+I-

-1.03
(-1.19)

0.08
( 0. 18)

Geographic diversification

+I-

3.68
(2.57)

1.74
(3.13)

Fraction of total pay as bonus

+

-4.94
(-1.33)

-1.31
(-0.91)

Sensitivity of wealth to stock price

+

0.65
(1.50)

0.24
(1.41)

-5.40
(-1.03)

-3.21
(-1.58)

3-yr avg. cash +marketable securities
3-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual (CFO I assets)

+

12.16
(0.72)

5.64
(0.87)

3-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual (NI I assets)

+

12.16
(0.72)

5.64
(0.87)

223

223

3. 1%

6.1%

#of observations
Adjusted R-squared

t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defmed in Tables 1, 2 and 7.

